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The drive for perfection and certainty lie deep in American culture, but the law of prior appropriation has long made the realization 
of these goals incomplete for water users in the 
western United States. To resolve both simple and 
complex water use disputes, the West — with the 
exception of California — has primarily followed 
the law of prior appropriation for over a century 
and a half. The doctrine has evolved from a 
customary rule to resolve disputes between rival 
mining claimants, to a complex system of judicial 
and administrative irrigation rights,2 and in the last 
four decades as a vehicle to change the West from 
a colonial commodity production economy to a 
modern urban service and agribusiness one. Today, 
the doctrine that supported the Reclamation Era is 
once again adapting to the start of the reallocation 
and “smart” (smaller) project era, the consequent 
shrinkage of the irrigation economy and the 
recognition of “quasi-riparian” Indian and federal 
reserved water rights to support non-consumptive 
environmental water use.
State Efforts to Achieve Certainty
Prior appropriation, however, is not a regime of 
consistently enforced exclusive entitlements, but a 
mix of customary practices, right holder forbearance 
backed in many places by carry-over storage 
specifically designed to avoid using the law as a risk 
management scheme. The West has managed to live 
and prosper with these uncertainties for decades, but 
it has always been uneasy with this state of affairs 
and sought to make water rights perfectively certain. 
Starting with Elwood Mead’s unsuccessful efforts to 
firm up water rights in Colorado, the western states 
have searched for ways to make these rights more 
certain. They have used administrative allocation, 
special water courts, and stream adjudications.3 
Until the 1970s, these adjudications were generally 
small scale, incomplete and limited to tributaries of 
a main stem and many decrees were stale.
Adjudications were incomplete because until 
1952, the western states could not join the federal 
government in a state adjudication. The McCarran 
Amendment4 waived the federal government’s 
sovereign immunity for “the adjudication of 
rights to the use water of a river system or other 
source…” In the 1970s, the scale of adjudications 
increased because of two important United States 
Supreme Court decisions that created incentives 
for the western states to invest in adjudication.  In 
1971, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a general 
stream adjudication did not have to include the 
broadest possible definition of a stream system, 
tributaries, mainstem and connected ground water.5 
Five years later, the Court held that the waiver of 
sovereignty immunity included Indian claims and 
moreover that a prior federal action could be stayed 
to allow a state court proceeding to adjudicate the 
claims.19  Consequently, Arizona, Idaho, Montana 
and Washington state invested in adjudications of 
the states’ major rivers. States such as New Mexico 
and Utah have substantially completed ongoing 
adjudications.
McCarran Act adjudications have two primary 
objectives. The first is to increase the security 
of water rights by eliminating as many of the 
previously discussed uncertainties as possible. 
The second objective was to remove the cloud on 
western water “titles” posed by the doctrines of 
federal reserved Indian and non-Indian public land 
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water rights. The Supreme Court has recognized a 
special class of water rights for tribes and a limited 
class of public land reservations. These rights are 
mixed appropriative-riparian rights.  They arise by 
reason of the creation of an Indian reservation or 
federal land management unit, such as a National 
Wildlife Refuge, for a water-related purpose.
Have Adjudications Been Worth the 
Price? 
The ultimate question posed by these adjudications 
is, have they been worth it? Most are still ongoing; 
only Idaho’s Snake River adjudication and Wyoming’s 
Big Horn adjudication are scheduled to wind up in the 
next few years. Nonetheless, to many westerners, the 
answer is of course they are.6 The value of adjudication 
is assumed to be a matter of faith and thus there is no 
need to measure the value by more objective standards 
such as benefit-cost analysis.  For example, after noting 
that as of 2004 Montana had invested over $37.5 
million in its unfinished general stream, the Upper 
Clark River Basin Steering Committee reported that 
the “ongoing adjudication is causing uncertainty for 
water rights enforcement in basins with old decrees. 
Because preliminary may not incorporate all of the 
historic use information in the old decrees, preliminary 
decrees issued by the Water Court may be in conflict 
with historic and existing uses.”7  Nonetheless, it 
recommended that more money be spent to ensure 
consistent, accurate final decrees.
The merits of this faith-based argument aside, a 
benefit-cost analysis is not possible. It would have 
the same flaws that efforts to quantify the value 
of environmental regulations face; the costs are 
immediate but the benefits materialize in the future 
so any number is biased in favor of high costs and 
low benefits. One might try to compare jurisdictions 
that have not invested in adjudication with those that 
have, but the results can range from the sensible 
to the absurd and irrelevant. One could compare 
Montana, which, as of 2004, had invested over 
$37.5 million of state money in its adjudication, with 
California with its extensive system of reservoirs, 
canals and aqueducts and its long tradition of solving 
water problems by spending money on carry-over 
storage, but the comparison would be irrelevant 
because of the vast differences between water uses 
in the two states.
Despite the impossibility of doing full-scale 
benefit-cost analysis, as costs mounted and the 
decades piled up, other states began to cast the cold 
eye of crude benefit-cost analysis to the cost of 
general stream adjudications and sought faster, less 
costly ways of quantifying rights, especially Indian 
reserved water rights.8  In 2002, the Washington 
state Department of Ecology and Office of the 
Attorney General submitted a report on the Yakima 
general adjudication, now in its third decade.9  To 
speed up the process, it recommended, among 
other things, a greater role for the Department in 
making tentative determinations and validating 
registered water rights. The report also suggested 
allowing limited special adjudications that would 
allow the Department to initiate an adjudication that 
would cover a limited number of issues and would 
not affect all water users in the basin, although it 
recognized that this would not qualify as a McCarran 
Amendment general adjudication.
In general, the problems with a benefit-cost analysis 
suggest that one can only ask some hard questions 
such as (1) have the adjudications fulfilled their 
intended objectives, (2) do all users need adjudicated 
rights, and (3) how well have the adjudications 
dealt with the most significant challenges to modern 
water management that have materialized in the 
past decades. The last question is relevant because 
the assertion of large quantities of Winters rights 
materialized as the proponents of adjudication 
expected, but adjudications took place against three 
major, less anticipated changed conditions.
In the remainder of this article, I focus on whether 
the adjudications have fulfilled their intended 
objectives and how well the adjudications have 
dealt with three significant challenges to modern 
water management that have materialized in the 
past decades. My basic conclusions are (1) the 
adjudications, with the help of the United States 
Supreme Court, have succeeded in cabining, or 
tightly circumscribing, the extent of non-Indian 
federal reserved rights for public lands, (2) the 
adjudications have allowed Indian tribes to obtain 
congressional water rights settlements that give 
them much more economic and ecological benefits 
than they would have obtained had they pursued 
their claims to a final decree, (3) the adjudications 
will provide some help as the states adjust to the end 
of the Reclamation Era and the new risks of global 
climate change, but (4) the adjudications have not 
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been able to deal effectively with federal regulatory 
water rights arising under the Clean Water and 
Endangered Species Acts, although the risks of 
disruption from the enforcement of these statutes 
has diminished considerably since the George W. 
Bush Administration took office.  
Changed Conditions
The current general adjudications are premised 
on the assumption that water management consists 
primarily of the enforcement of priorities. Priority 
enforcement is an important component of modern 
water management, but it is not the only one. Modern 
water management is a moving not a static target, 
especially as we move from the Reclamation to the 
post-Reclamation era. Specifically, the collective 
state decisions to pursue general adjudications 
assumed (1) that the West’s historic, variable 
climate cycles would not significantly change in 
amplitude, (2) that federal and state governments 
would continue to back-stop water rights by the 
construction of carry-over storage, (3) that the 
primary use of water would be irrigated agriculture, 
(4) that cities and non-consumptive users such as 
hydroelectric facilities could share the rest with 
comparatively little friction, and (5) that the main 
competitors for the water traditionally shared among 
the triad of irrigation, municipal and industrial use 
and hydropower generation would be Indian tribes. 
All of these assumptions have been severely eroded 
in the past four decades. 
Since the adjudications began, the West has 
undergone many interrelated changes. First, the 
Reclamation era has ended. Supply augmentation 
is no longer the primary objective of federal and 
state water policy. As the 2005 California water 
Plan Update dryly observed, “[S]tate and federal 
projects have not expanded as originally expected, 
in fact, diversions have been reduced in recognition 
of environmental needs.”10  Second, the West’s 
variable climate is likely to become more variable 
due to global warming. Third, fish are gaining more 
power as a proxy for environmental values. 
The End of the Reclamation Era
The progressive conservation vision of large, 
multiple-purpose dams, located through regional 
planning, dominated water policy until the late 
1960s until the environmental movement shattered 
it. The environmental movement built on earlier 
calls for greater federal fiscal restraint to undermine 
the doubtful case for dams as catalysts of regional 
development. The failure of the 1944 Pick-Sloan Plan 
to deliver irrigation benefits to the Upper Missouri 
Basin is a case in point.11  Throughout the world, 
many dams have underperformed and have produced 
unacceptably high, ignored social costs. Rivers have 
been transformed from free-flowing into regulated 
rivers. As a result, there are growing threats to the 
ecological integrity of watersheds worldwide. 
The environmental movement changed our 
perception of the earth and the value of the unmodified 
riverine landscapes,12 and as a result, we now value 
free flowing rivers, their connected corridors and 
the ecosystem services that they provide. Today, the 
focus is on the management and the reoperation of 
existing dams and less environmentally destructive 
water storage options. For example, the influential 
2000 Report of the World Commission on Dams13 
recommended a more rigorous assessment of 
proposed new dams and that much attention be 
focused on the reoperation of existing dams and 
irrigation systems and on the promotion of more 
sustainable water storage and use technologies. 
Ironically, the end of the river basin development 
era means that in the future the competition for water 
resources will become more rather than less intense. 
Rapidly growing cities are competing with irrigated 
agriculture for limited supplies, and environmental 
interests are competing with all major consumptive 
uses as well as the hydroelectric power industry 
for increased in-stream flows or more “natural” 
hydrologic regimes.14  The possibility that global 
warming will alter traditional snow pack and run off 
patterns adds an additional element of uncertainty to 
the competition. In many areas, runoffs may occur 
earlier in the year and increased evaporation will 
decrease available supplies and base flows during 
periods of peak summer demand.15
Future competition will be extremely messy 
because the end of the Reclamation Era has 
dramatically shrunk federal power and influence. The 
two major water agencies, the Bureau of Reclamation 
and Corps of Engineers, are increasingly assuming 
a more passive role in water conflicts because they 
have little to bring to the table. For example, in 2003 
Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton unveiled the 
Department’s new water strategy, Water 2025.16 
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Formally, the plan announced that the Department 
would concentrate its resources on ten hot spots in 
the West, but the underlying message was that the 
western states could not expect the Department to 
built new projects or to supply much in the way of 
policy leadership. The Bureau, of course, still has 
considerable leverage on the Colorado River and in 
the operation of specific reservoirs.
The net result of the shift to reallocation is to 
increase the need for water transfers, especially 
from existing to new uses, to meet new demands 
caused by continued population growth and the rise 
of new societal values, primarily environmental 
protection. Most modern transfers will move water 
relatively short distances. They will not be massive 
interregional and international schemes that were 
often proposed by visionary engineers and politicians 
in the past. Nonetheless, many of these transfers will 
be extremely controversial because they threaten to 
disrupt established economic and cultural patterns, 
stress ecosystems17 and raise long-standing fears 
about the monopolization of water.18 In general, 
states have either de jure delegated water planning 
responsibility to lower levels of government or de 
facto to the federal government.
Global Warming
Evidence continues to mount that the earth’s 
climate is warming and that this warming can distort 
“normal water allocation” patterns. The precise 
impacts on specific basins and sub-basins are still 
difficult to predict because the climate change models 
suggest that the impacts of climate change will vary 
greatly among the earth’s regions. Any watershed 
or river basin prediction must deal with high levels 
of hydrologic, economic and political uncertainty. 
However, the general risks that arid areas face can be 
stated with some confidence, although the geographic 
and temporal scale of the change is uncertain. The 
biggest risk is that there will be increased precipitation, 
but this precipitation may actually exacerbate efforts 
to provide reliable water supplies.19
 More precipitation may fall as winter rain 
rather than snow, and thus the snowpacks may 
melt earlier as warmer average temperatures mean 
that spring runoffs will come earlier and evaporate 
faster. California is the first to expressly incorporate 
global climate change into its planning. The 2005 
California State Water Plan Update notes that a 
2.1°C change, well within most general circulation 
models, could result in a 52 percent reduction in 
the April- July snowpack runoff.20  Among the first 
adverse environmental impacts would be the loss 
of cool water on which salmon depend.
Back to Eden: Fish Power and River            
Restoration    
The third changed condition is the growing 
pressure to improve or restore degraded aquatic 
ecosystems. The World Commission of Dams 
reported that dams inundate large areas and kill 
terrestrial plants and displace animals. In addition, 
reservoirs may account from 1 percent to 28 percent 
of all green house gas emissions. Large dams 
“compromise the dynamic aspects of rivers that is 
fundamental to maintaining the character of aquatic 
ecosystems.”21   A series of influential studies in 
the United States, Europe and the Middle East22 
has recently led to the radical idea of managing 
river systems to maximize ecological functions. 
The newly developing science of conservation 
biology furnishes the scientific underpinnings 
for new management paradigms. Conservation 
biology posits that all river systems — modified 
and “natural” — must be seen as dynamic, ever-
changing functioning ecosystems which serve 
a variety of functions from the maintenance of 
consumptive uses to the provision of valuable 
ecosystem services. The current focus is on river 
restoration because so many large systems have 
been modified.23  In the United States, large-scale 
environmental river management usually occurs in 
the shadow of the Endangered Species Act.  
General Adjudication and Change Adaptation
The above changes impact all western states so 
they will have to adapt regardless of the status of 
adjudications. Adjudications may marginally help 
the states adapt to the end of the Reclamation Era 
and to global climate change, although the doctrine 
of prior appropriation has shown a remarkable 
ability to adapt without the quantification provided 
by general adjudications. The question of how 
general adjudications will impact demands for 
environmental base flows is more complicated. 
In brief, adjudications will help the western states 
adapt to the end of the Reclamation Era and global 
climate change. The states’ best current strategy to 
respond to both these conditions is the reallocation 
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of agricultural use to both urban and environmental 
uses through water transfers. Irrigated agriculture’s 
rights are de facto being used as reservoirs for 
continued urban growth and, to a lesser degree, as 
source of supply for environmental flows. In theory, 
the firmer the property right, the less the transaction 
costs of transfer.24
The more relevant question is whether lowered 
transaction costs are worth the investment in general 
adjudications? In modern water practice, the threat 
of enforcement is generally more important than 
the actual enforcement because it often encourages 
water users to cooperate either to reduce the risk 
of enforcement to as close to zero as possible or to 
share more equitably the burdens of shortages. The 
formation of the Southern Nevada Water Authority to 
find regional solutions to supplement Nevada’s limited 
Colorado River priority and to allow Las Vegas to 
continue to sprawl is an example of the incentives 
that enforcement threats can provide. Adjudication 
increases the risk of enforcement and thus it may spur 
new innovative water use patterns.
This said, the fact that priority is more bluff than 
substance does not undermine the need for consistent 
and fair allocation rules, but it does call into question 
the reliance on enforcement of accurately decreed 
priorities to allocate water in temporary and chronic 
shortages. Most water users are “repeat users” and 
thus they have incentives to share rather than stand 
on their rights — at least if Indian reserved water 
rights are not involved. This is especially true on 
larger rather than smaller streams. Thus, it is not 
surprising that states have taken extraordinary steps 
to ensure that the rule is never applied in practice 
and that federal, state and local water distribution 
agencies find alternative ways to ameliorate  the rule 
when droughts occur.
Cabining Reserved Rights
In addition to firming up appropriative rights, 
general adjudications accepted the argument that 
all federal Indian and non-Indian federal reserved 
rights should be quantified. The hope, of course, 
was that quantification would mean that the rights 
would be entitled to modest quantities of water. 
Like performers in stylized Kabuki Theater, Indian 
tribes asserted claims to vast amounts of water on 
the West’s over appropriated rivers. The federal 
government also appeared to claim water for various 
categories of land withdrawals such as wilderness 
areas, national parks and wildlife refuges. The 
specter of federal regulatory water rights arose while 
the adjudications were in progress and presented an 
unanticipated challenge. In general, the adjudications 
have curbed non-Indian reserved rights due in large 
part to a Supreme Court decision that severely 
limited them and the subsequent unwillingness of the 
Court to police hostile state court decisions. Indian 
tribes, in contrast, have been able to use general 
adjudications to negotiate federal settlements that 
have given them far more “wet water” and leverage 
than they could ever have obtained had their rights 
been simply adjudicated.
Indian Claims: The Federal Slot Machine 
Keeps Ringing
Indians have fared well in the adjudication 
process because Indian tribal rights have survived 
the Supreme Court’s erosion of tribal sovereignty 
and have long represented a serious cloud on western 
water titles such as they are because of the amount of 
water that can be claimed.  Before the Supreme Court 
narrowed the scope of public land reserved rights, 
it adopted practicable irrigable acreage as the tribal 
standard.25  The Court came close to replacing the 
standard with one much more favorable to standard,26 
but PIA remains the law. PIA is the basis for many 
liberal tribal claims because the Court has adopted 
conclusions of special masters that PIA does not 
require a positive benefit-cost analysis and tribes 
are not limited to farming methods in use at the 
time that the reservation was created.27 Nonetheless, 
tribal rights remain largely inchoate as the federal 
government funded Indian irrigation projects at much 
lower rates compared to non-Indian projects under 
the Reclamation Act of 1902.
Balanced against the PIA standard is the fact that 
federal reserved rights may be adjudicated in state 
courts.28  State courts must apply federal law, but 
courts have considerable discretion to shape the 
law.29  Arizona rejected PIA and substituted a home 
land sustainability standard,30 but the impact of the 
new standard on tribal claims remains unclear.  As 
discussed in the next section, the Supreme Court 
has imposed another potential barrier on Winters 
rights, but the tribes have been unable to avoid the 
limitation.  Non-Indian reserved rights are limited 
to the minimum amount necessary to prevent 
the frustration of the primary objectives of the 
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withdrawal.  Arizona has rejected this standard as 
inapplicable to Indian reservations31 and the Ninth 
Circuit downgraded the standard to a guideline.32
In practice, general stream adjudications have 
served as a catalyst for a number of major negotiated 
settlements that have given Indians wet water 
and removed barriers to off-reservation uses. 
Westerners insisted that Winters rights were for on 
reservation irrigation and could not be used off the 
reservation.  Some settlements have been separate 
from adjudications, but others have been entered 
final decrees. The settlements have generally 
required the tribes to trade the full potential Winters 
right for a lesser amount of wet rights sweetened by 
cash and other benefits that a judicial decree cannot 
grant. Tribes have often received two major benefits: 
the provision of water to the reservation at federal or 
state rate payer expense and the ability to turn surplus 
water into cash by leasing it to non-Indian users.33
The recent Nez Pez and Gila settlements 
illustrate how the adjudications stimulated favorable 
settlements. Idaho’s adjudication created a less than 
favorable legal climate for the Nez Perce tribe, but 
a favorable Congressional settlement was enacted 
in 2004.34  The settlement went far beyond the 
quantification of tribal water rights and resolved 
federal land uses and put in place new management 
initiatives to improve the public land and tribal 
watershed. Under the settlement, the federal 
government as trustee for the tribe filed instream 
flow claims to all the water in the Snake, Salmon 
and Clearwater basins to support tribal treaty fishing 
rights. The settlement gave the tribes 50,000 acre 
feet per year for on reservation use. Among the 
other monetary and management benefits are $23 
million for the construction of an on-reservation 
water system, a $10.1 million payment for the 
tribe’s contracting for uncontracted storage space 
in the Payette River system and a federal-state-
tribal cooperative program to improve instream 
flows and fish habitat and passage in the Salmon 
and Clearwater Basins.35  The Gila River Indian 
Community, along with other tribes, received the 
largest water rights settlement in history. In brief, 
the tribes obtained 47 percent of the Central Arizona 
Project (CAP) allocation originally dedicated to 
Phoenix and Tucson and the power to lease water 
back to the cities. The Gila received 197,500 acre 
feet of CAP water which it can devote to the revival 
of reservation farming or lease to cities.36
Non-Indian Federal Reserved Rights
In contrast to the tribe’s success in using negotiated 
settlements to avoid the risks of a full-scale 
adjudication, the federal land management agencies 
have not fared well. The states have been able to draw 
on the long tradition of deference to state water law 
and hostility to any form of federal preemption backed 
by the Supreme Court’s apparent lack of interest on 
policing state adjudications. The enforcement of the 
Endangered Species Act is an exception, but from 
the Klamath to the Rio Grande, the states have been 
able to blunt its preemptive effect.
In the initial settlement of the West, the federal 
government did not assert an interest in the waters 
attached to the public domain. In theory, almost all 
western water rights should derive from the federal 
government’s riparian rights incident to the public 
domain. However, settlement preceded the federal 
government’s efforts to assert federal water rights 
during the Progressive Conservation Era.37  Instead, 
Congress validated the claims of those who illegally 
entered the public domain and put public water 
to use, and this forbearance allowed the western 
states to development the theory that the federal 
government severed water from the public lands and 
thus the states had the exclusive power to allocate and 
manage western waters. The Supreme Court accepted 
this flawed logic in 1935.  It was not until the 1962 
decision Arizona v. California38 that the Supreme 
Court has recognized that the federal government can 
claim federal reserved rights to fulfill the purposes of a 
public land withdrawal. By this time, state hostility to 
the idea of federal water rights had become ingrained 
in the region’s political consciousness. 
The legacy of the state’s claim to exclusive control 
is powerful. In United States v. New Mexico, the 
Supreme Court made it easy to express this hostility 
by severely limiting the federal government’s power 
to assert non-Indian federal reserved water rights.39 
Non-Indian federal reserved rights are limited to the 
minimum amount of water necessary to accomplish the 
primary purposes of the reservation. In cases involving 
claims for a wilderness area in a national forest, the 
Court reasoned that the 1897 Forest Service Organic 
Act limited national forests to “securing favorable 
conditions of water flows” for downstream irrigators 
and cities and “a continuous supply of timber….” This 
standard has severely limited the amount of water that 
the federal government can claim for national parks, 
wilderness areas and wildlife refuges.
Tarlock
Journal of Contemporary Water researCh & eduCationUCOWR
New Mexico permitted the United States to 
obtain reserved rights for some national parks 
and monuments,40 but, in general,  federal land 
management agencies have been unable to find a way 
around the decision, especially in hostile states such 
as Idaho. Idaho developed a substantial anti-federal 
reserved rights jurisprudence based on the court’s 
“reading” of history.41  It also backtracked from 
its earlier precedent-setting decision recognizing 
instream flows and held a diversion is necessary to 
perfect a water right except for livestock watering 
and state-held instream flow rights. 
After New Mexico, the Forest Service asserted 
that the Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act created 
reserved rights, but state courts uniformly rejected 
this claim.42  The Forest Service also tried to assert 
reserved rights for sediment transport to preserve the 
hydrologic integrity of a stream. A federal district 
court agreed that stream integrity was a favorable 
condition, but held that the flows were not necessary 
to support this hydrologic function.43  Thus, the 
primary federal instream strategy is to file for a 
state appropriative right and present this claim in a 
general adjudication.
The federal government has in fact filed many 
public land claims as well as instream flow claims 
under state law. In New Mexico, the western states 
argued that state law and the regulatory authority 
of the federal government provided an adequate, 
alternative avenue for the federal government 
to obtain the necessary water to support public 
land withdrawals. The promise has often proved 
illusory. In Colorado and Idaho, the Forest Service 
encountered a Catch 22: state instream flow rights 
can only be held by a state agency.44  To obtain an 
instream flow, the Forest Service had to petition the 
Colorado Water Conservation Board to file for one.45 
Reserved rights were obtained for the Gunnison and 
Rio Grande National Forests in Colorado after the 
United States agreed to subordinate most of its claims 
to all existing state rights with a pre-1999 priority 
date and to other conditions to protect exist users.46
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt (1992- 
2000) was successful in overcoming New Mexico. 
He secured several important reserved rights through 
negotiation and the creation of hybrid federal-state 
rights. Utah right holders agreed to recognize an 
unquantified reserved right on the Virgin River above 
Zion’s National Park.47 A federal non-reserved right 
was created for the Great Sand Dunes National Park 
in Colorado. The federal government appropriated 
surface and ground water under Colorado state 
law, but the National Park Service is the holder of 
the right and the right is defined by federal law, 
unappropriated surface and ground water necessary 
to protect the Dunes ecosystem.48 
Alternative Federal Rights: Federal            
Regulatory Water Rights
Alternative federal water rights claims have met 
with limited success. Starting in the 1950s, the 
Forest Service conditioned permits to construct 
diversion, transportation and storage facilities on 
public lands to require that sufficient water be left 
in streams to sustain fish during low-water periods. 
Either water had to be released from the reservoir 
or it had to bypass a diversion facility. In the 
1990s, these “bypass flows” generated a great deal 
of controversy, and in the end a federal task force 
rejected the long held position of the Forest Service 
that they had the authority to impose these flows 
before and after the passage of the Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act over the strong dissents 
of Elizabeth Ann Rieke, David Getches, and Richard 
Roos-Collins.49  One of the arguments against their 
recognition was “the relative priorities of right of 
use of water [sic] that have or will be established 
in the McCarran adjudications are meaningless. 
Simply put, for most national forests there would 
be no purpose in the assertion of federal reserved 
rights by the United States if it could control the use 
of water through land use conditions.”
Several of the federal environmental statutes, 
most notably the Endangered Species Act and 
the Clean Water Act, have the potential to require 
state water right holders to limit their uses. Federal 
environmental mandates have sometimes been 
classified as federal regulatory water rights to signal 
this underappreciated attribute. However, these are 
not rights in any traditional sense because they are 
ad hoc and episodic. Thus, they are difficult, if not 
impossible, to fit into adjudications. In some cases, 
complaints were filed against federal agencies or 
the statutes were enforced as adjudications ground 
on. This happened in the Klamath Basin when the 
Bureau of Reclamation shut down the headgates 
of the Klamath project to protect endangered fish 
during the drought summer of 2001.50  However, 
since 2001, the Bureau of Reclamation has prepared 
long-term operating plans that preserve the status 
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quo. When the U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, 
held that New Mexico had to release water in the Rio 
Grande to preserve the silvery minnow, Congress 
quickly reversed the decision.
One state, Idaho, has been able to incorporate 
the ESA into its general adjudication. To “address” 
federal public land and Indian claims, the basin’s 
major water users formed a federal coalition. In 
1998, the Fifth Judicial District Court ordered 
that all federal and tribal claims be mediated. 
Mediation produced a “Term Sheet” in 2004.51 
The ESA was addressed in two ways. First, an 
earlier agreement to protect power and fish flows52 
was incorporated into the adjudication decree. 
The Swan Falls agreement is implemented by 
willing yearly water rights leases. To cabin future 
enforcement of the ESA, the plan is to have the two 
federal agencies, the Fish and Wildlife Service and 
National Marine Fisheries Service, issue 30 year 
Biological Opinions that will provide incidental 
take authorization for all public and private actions. 
However, the agreement recognizes that the ESA 
precludes complete certainty:
The Mediator’s term Sheet provides that, 
to the maximum extent practicable, the United 
states shall be responsible for managing water 
acquired or rented pursuant to the agreement to 
needs of all species covered by the agreement, 
and in a manner that will not result in the 
violation of any permit, applicable water quality 
rule and regulation or other requirements of 
the Clean Water Act, and in a manner a manner 
that will not cause jeopardy to others species in 
Idaho or result in significant adverse impacts to 
recreational users of waters of the Snake River 
or its tributaries within the state of Idaho.53
 
The Nez Perce settlement in Idaho also includes 
numerous fish conservation provisions that will 
facilitate compliance with ESA mandates. A joint 
tribal-federal-state agreement will free up 200,000 
acre feet of Dworkshak Reservoir water for salmon 
conservation and a $50 million water and fisheries 
trust fund will be established.  
Conclusion
McCarran Amendment adjudications seek to 
achieve perpetual certainty perfect harmony among 
water users. A leading Italian anti-Fascist diplomat 
better described the objective of water dispute 
management. He characterized his objective in 
negotiating a Post World War I treaty between 
Italy and the newly created Yugoslavia as “that 
the causes of discontent should be equally divided 
between the two nations.”54  Contrary to the hopes 
of the proponents of general adjudications, most 
have not proceeded to the entry of a final decree 
in a reasonable period of time and at a reasonable 
cost.  Instead, the proceedings have morphed into a 
variety of alternative dispute resolution processes. 
Increasingly, the states have turned to negotiated 
settlements, backed by federal dollars, to achieve 
their objectives. In short, the experience to date 
suggests that general adjudications will function as 
one of several management instruments rather than 
the primary instrument as the western states struggle 
to cope with continued urbanization, the pressures 
to maintain and restore degraded watersheds and 
global climate change. 
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